Noah Poly Index — PolyMarket
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Audited performance data from our prediction market signal engine. 35 exited trades, tracked from entry to resolution.
68.6%
Directional Accuracy
+49.5%
Avg Return / Trade
24W–11L
Win-Loss Record
42
Contracts Scanned
14.5x
Profit Factor
+77.6%
Avg Winner
-11.7%
Avg Loser
6.6x
Win/Loss Ratio
📈
Equity
Compounding curve 🧠 Signals
Live beliefs 📊 Trades
Full chart cards 🎯 Edges
Active positions 🏆 Discipline
Rulebook trades
Compounding curve 🧠 Signals
Live beliefs 📊 Trades
Full chart cards 🎯 Edges
Active positions 🏆 Discipline
Rulebook trades
NEWS · Crypto
Bitcoin ETF Inflows Signal Market Mispricing
As Bitcoin extends its recovery, buoyed by record inflows into BlackRock’s iShares Bitcoin Trust, the cryptocurrency has reached a pivotal moment. With prices in the $77,000 to $80,000 range, traders are grappling with the question of whether this bullish momentum can withstand a dense band of resistance or if it is merely a temporary reprieve before testing lower support levels. The market appears to be undervaluing the sustained institutional interest signified by recent inflows, which totaled approximately $3 billion by April 23. Despite earlier net outflows from the U.S. Bitcoin ETF market, BlackRock’s fund demonstrated resilience, capturing about three-quarters of the capital entering the sector. This discrepancy suggests the market may be overlooking the potential for further price appreciation, particularly…
NEWS · Crypto
PENGU Token Surges Amid Brand Revival
Pudgy Penguins' PENGU token has experienced a significant rebound, surging over 80% in a single session on April 23, 2026. This surge comes after a challenging period for holders, as the token faced substantial price corrections since its debut in late 2024. The rally is attributed to a combination of a broader risk-on environment in crypto markets and strategic brand expansions, including partnerships and new product offerings. Market analysts suggest that the recent price movement may be mispriced due to lingering skepticism surrounding the token's sustainability. Despite renewed interest driven by brand growth and consumer engagement, the PENGU token still grapples with a challenging balance between speculative trading and long-term viability. Moreover, the impending token unlock could pressure prices if…
NEWS · Intelligence
CME Futures to Revive SUI's Institutional Appeal
The CME Group's announcement to list SUI futures on May 4 marks a significant step in institutional engagement with the Sui token, which has been languishing around $0.94. Despite a modest daily gain, SUI's trading activity remains tepid, with a market value of approximately $3.72 billion, indicating a market that is hesitant to commit without clearer catalysts. Analysts highlight a descending channel characterized by lower highs and lows, suggesting a cautious sentiment prevails. The current market dynamics appear to undervalue the potential impact of the CME's regulated trading environment on SUI. Institutional traders may find the cash-settled futures attractive for managing risk, yet the existing market price does not reflect this newfound accessibility. NOAH's PolyHunter system identifies a 15% upside…
Disciplined Edge v1
Based on pattern analysis of 59 PolyHunter trades. High-probability setups only: proven edge types, top grades, favourable market structure. Excludes MEDIUM risk tier (only net-losing tier) and extreme market prices.
+$32,872
Conforming P&L
78.9%
Win Rate
15W–4L
Record (20 trades)
9.0x
Profit Factor
$1,644
Avg $/trade
+33.9%
Sector Alpha vs ETF
+$8,810
Best Trade
-$1,272
Worst Trade
#
Event
Type
Grade
Entry → Exit
P&L
Cash
1
Will inflation reach more than 3% in 2026?
CONSENSUS
A
10c → 29c
+176.2%
WIN
2
Will 1 Fed rate cut happen in 2026?
CONSENSUS
A
7c → 16c
+137.4%
WIN
3
Hezbollah strike on Israel by March 31?
CONSENSUS
B
53c → 100c
+88.4%
WIN
4
Will Iran close the Strait of Hormuz by March 31?
CONSENSUS
B
35c → 18c
+50.0%
WIN
5
Will Iran close the Strait of Hormuz by March 31?
CONSENSUS
B
35c → 18c
+50.0%
WIN
6
Israel strikes Iran by February 28, 2026?
CONSENSUS
A
35c → 20c
+44.3%
WIN
7
Iran Strike on Israel by February 28?
CONSENSUS
B
26c → 16c
+36.5%
WIN
8
Iran strike on US military by February 28?
CONSENSUS
B
25c → 16c
+36.0%
WIN
9
Iran Strike on Israel by February 28?
CONSENSUS
B
28c → 21c
+25.0%
WIN
10
Tariff increase on Canada in effect by June 30?
CONSENSUS
A
19c → 23c
+21.1%
WIN
11
US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30?
CONSENSUS
A
34c → 39c
+16.4%
WIN
12
US-Iran nuclear deal by June 30?
CONSENSUS
A
34c → 39c
+16.4%
WIN
13
Will Israel or the US target Tehran?
CONSENSUS
B
21c → 17c
+16.3%
WIN
14
Israel strikes Iran by March 31, 2026?
CONSENSUS
B
57c → 50c
+13.0%
WIN
15
Israel strikes Iran by March 31, 2026?
CONSENSUS
B
57c → 50c
+13.0%
WIN
16
Will US GDP growth in Q1 2026 be greater than 3.5%?
CONSENSUS
B
40c → 40c
+0.0%
FLAT
17
Will the US next strike Iran during the week of Febr...
CONSENSUS
A
21c → 20c
-7.1%
LOSS
18
US strikes Iran by March 15, 2026?
CONSENSUS
A
42c → 52c
-20.0%
LOSS
19
Hezbollah strike on Israel by February 28?
CONSENSUS
A
14c → 10c
-25.0%
LOSS
20
U.S. x Iran Military Engagement by March 31, 2026?
CONSENSUS
A
57c → 72c
-20.0%
LOSS
NEWS · Crypto
Bitcoin's Role as a Liquidity Indicator
As Bitcoin continues to solidify its position as a gauge of global liquidity, it influences market dynamics in the cryptocurrency sector. Analysts now view Bitcoin less as a speculative asset and more as a macro-sensitive indicator of money supply, a perspective that aligns with its historical performance amid changing liquidity conditions. The implications of this evolving narrative are significant for traders seeking the next substantial crypto breakout. The market may be mispricing the potential of smaller projects like APEMARS. While Bitcoin remains the anchor asset, newer cryptocurrencies are vying for attention amid the broader liquidity landscape, with APEMARS positioned as an early-stage opportunity. Traders may be underestimating its upside, as the market often overlooks emerging assets until they gain traction,…
NEWS · Intelligence
Polygon's Liquid Staking Faces Market Skepticism
As Polygon launches its new liquid staking token, sPOL, to unlock $330 million in DeFi capital, the market's response remains muted. Despite impressive upgrades, such as reducing block finality to under five seconds with the Giugliano hard fork, the price outlook for POL is cautious, hovering around $0.092 with a projected ceiling of $0.28 by 2026. This reflects a prevalent belief that infrastructure improvements will lead to gradual adoption rather than immediate price gains. Market mispricing may stem from skepticism surrounding Polygon's ability to translate technical enhancements into tangible on-chain usage. While the network is poised for increased liquidity and capital efficiency, traders appear to be adopting a wait-and-see approach, especially with emerging competitors like Pepeto promoting rapid returns through…
Trade Lifecycle
0 active · 42 exited
Real trades only — from wave entry (B) to exit (S). Green = above entry, orange = below.
Edge Asymmetry — Winners vs Losers
+77.6% avg
-11.7% avg
Profit factor: 14.5x — winners outpace losers. The green bar below each trade shows relative impact.
#1
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+798.0%
WIN
#2
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+691.7%
WIN
#3
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+83.9%
WIN
#4
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+70.3%
WIN
#5
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+40.3%
WIN
Trades 6–30 ▼
#6
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+36.8%
WIN
#7
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+17.1%
WIN
#8
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+16.5%
WIN
#9
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+16.2%
WIN
#10
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+14.0%
WIN
#11
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+13.1%
WIN
#12
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+11.5%
WIN
#13
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+11.5%
WIN
#14
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+7.4%
WIN
#15
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+7.0%
WIN
#16
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+5.6%
WIN
#17
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+4.5%
WIN
#18
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+3.8%
WIN
#19
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+3.8%
WIN
#20
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+3.1%
WIN
#21
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+3.0%
WIN
#22
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+2.0%
WIN
#23
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+1.4%
WIN
#24
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+0.6%
WIN
#25
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+0.0%
FLAT
#26
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+0.0%
FLAT
#27
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+0.0%
FLAT
#28
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+0.0%
FLAT
#29
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+0.0%
FLAT
#30
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
+0.0%
FLAT
Trades 31–42 ▼
#31
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
+0.0%
FLAT
#32
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
-1.1%
LOSS
#33
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
-6.0%
LOSS
#34
CON
B
Exited: pmi window close
-8.7%
LOSS
#35
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
-8.7%
LOSS
#36
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
-8.9%
LOSS
#37
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
-9.7%
LOSS
#38
CON
B
Exited: filtered stop
-12.3%
LOSS
#39
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
-13.6%
LOSS
#40
CON
A
Exited: filtered stop
-14.7%
LOSS
#41
CON
A
Exited: filtered stop
-15.6%
LOSS
#42
CON
A
Exited: pmi window close
-29.6%
LOSS
NEWS · Intelligence
Market Mispricing of Humanity Protocol Token Gains Attention
Amidst a backdrop of speculative trading, Humanity Protocol has attracted notable attention, buoyed by increased whale activity and a surge of interest on major exchanges. The token recently rallied to approximately $0.12, driven by narrative momentum rather than underlying fundamentals, raising questions about its sustainability given the existing liquidity risks and supply concerns. Market perceptions may be misaligned, as traders focus on short-term gains without adequately accounting for the tokenomics challenges, including the option for early supporters to delay vesting until late 2026. NOAH's PolyHunter system has detected a significant gap, estimating a 15% probability edge that the token may correct as market realities set in, with a confidence grade of 88%. However, the risks remain substantial. Should the market…
Signal Intelligence ▼
27 beliefs from 338 reports · 1,693 total sources
Signal Intelligence ▼
27 beliefs from 338 reports · 1,693 total sources
Live beliefs extracted from our narrative signal engine, scored by evidence density, source authority, and momentum. Each card shows our house probability — the gap between our view and the market is where the edge lives. Showing Grade A–C beliefs (last 48h).
Geopolitics & Security
8 beliefs · 818 sources
CONSENSUS
Strong
A
Lebanon ceasefire erosion: Israeli strikes continue
House: 84%
(range: 79%–88%)
250 sources · 8% Tier-A · Consensus 0.78 · ↗ Accelerating · Contradiction low (0.12)
“Between 26 April 2026 and 29 April 2026 (inclusive), Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon will continue to be reported despite the ceasefire remaining nominally in place.”
→Will Israel conduct additional airstrikes in Lebanon by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will the Lebanon ceasefire be formally declared ended by any principal party by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will the UN issue another formal statement or briefing on Lebanon strikes by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will Israel announce an expanded operational objective in Lebanon by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
👁 Watch: Official IDF/Hezbollah statements on retaliation thresholds · UN/US statements indicating imminent ceasefire enforcement actions · Reports of strikes expanding beyond the current geographic pattern
⚠ Invalidated if: A credible, multi-source confirmation of a verified halt to strikes for a full 48h window · Formal de-escalation announcement with monitoring/enforcement details accepted by both parties
CONSENSUS
Strong
A
Hormuz: mine-clearing continues; full clearance unlikely (72h)
House: 77%
(range: 69%–84%)
50 sources · 10% Tier-A · Consensus 0.72 · → Stable · Contradiction low (0.14)
“The Strait of Hormuz will not be credibly confirmed as fully cleared of mines and fully normalised for commercial transit by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC.”
→Will the Strait of Hormuz be confirmed fully cleared of mines by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will commercial shipping be reported as fully normalised through the Strait of Hormuz by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will a new mine-related incident in/near the Strait of Hormuz be reported by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will a multinational demining coalition for the Strait of Hormuz be announced by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
👁 Watch: CENTCOM/US Navy operational updates on clearance progress · Insurance/shipping advisories (routing changes, risk premiums) signalling normalisation vs persistence · Reports of additional mining or counter-mining escalation
⚠ Invalidated if: Confirmed operational statement that mine threat has been eliminated and normal navigation restored · Independent reporting of sustained, normal commercial transits without incident
CONSENSUS
Strong
A
Oil shock risk: WTI ≥ $100 before 29 Apr 2026
House: 61%
(range: 44%–74%)
208 sources · 3% Tier-A · Consensus 0.76 · ↗ Accelerating · Contradiction low (0.12)
“At any point before the end of 29 April 2026, WTI crude oil will trade at or above $100 per barrel.”
→Will WTI crude trade at or above $100 before the end of 29 April 2026?
→Will a major, verified shipping incident in/near the Strait of Hormuz occur by 29 April 2026?
→Will the U.S. announce additional energy-related sanctions tied to Iran/Russia by 29 April 2026?
→Will a credible ceasefire/de-escalation announcement occur by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Verified shipping incidents in/near the Strait of Hormuz · New OFAC/Treasury actions affecting flows and insurance · Intraday crude volatility + options skew/volatility headlines
⚠ Invalidated if: Credible de-escalation/ceasefire announcement with operational compliance signals · Major supply offset announcement (e.g., coordinated releases or output response) that dominates coverage
EMERGING
Strong
A
US–Iran: no in-person delegation meeting announced (72h)
House: 74%
(range: 64%–82%)
100 sources · 7% Tier-A · Consensus 0.66 · ↘ Decelerating · Contradiction low (0.24)
“No in-person US–Iran delegation meeting will be publicly scheduled or confirmed between 26 April 2026 and 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC.”
→Will the US and Iran announce an in-person delegation meeting by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will the US reinstate a cancelled envoy trip for Iran talks by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will Oman or Pakistan publicly confirm hosting US–Iran delegations by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will the US and Iran announce a new negotiation framework (format, venue, timeline) by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
👁 Watch: Statements from US executive branch principals about format (phone vs in-person) · Signals of third-party hosting (Oman/Pakistan) with date/time specificity · Travel logistics leaks: delegations in the same location within a short window
⚠ Invalidated if: Public announcement of a specific time/place for a US–Iran delegation meeting · Credible confirmation that a cancelled delegation trip is reinstated
EMERGING
Strong
A
US keeps elevated carrier posture (no drawdown in 72h)
House: 83%
(range: 76%–88%)
50 sources · 4% Tier-A · Consensus 0.70 · → Stable · Contradiction low (0.12)
“The US will not publicly announce a material drawdown of aircraft-carrier presence in/near the Middle East theatre by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC.”
→Will the US announce a carrier drawdown from the Middle East theatre by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will a carrier strike group be reported departing the theatre by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will the US announce additional carrier deployments to the region by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will CENTCOM publish a force-posture update indicating reduced naval presence by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
👁 Watch: CENTCOM force posture releases · Carrier AIS/position reporting via credible tracking summaries · Pentagon briefings addressing duration/rotation of assets
⚠ Invalidated if: Official announcement of redeployment/withdrawal reducing carrier count in theatre · Confirmed movement orders indicating rapid departure from theatre
EMERGING
Strong
A
US base damage: more public detail likely in 72h
House: 58%
(range: 44%–70%)
94 sources · 6% Tier-A · Consensus 0.61 · ↘ Decelerating · Contradiction low (0.22)
“By 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC, there will be additional public detail (official statement or major-media reporting) that adds new specifics on damage/costs to US bases from Iranian...”
→Will the US release an updated damage assessment for bases hit by Iran by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will a major outlet publish new corroborated details (locations/costs/capability impacts) by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will Congress publicly request a briefing or supplemental funding tied to base damage by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will CENTCOM/DoD confirm additional affected facilities by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
👁 Watch: DoD/CENTCOM briefings and press Q&A · Congressional requests for assessments or supplemental funding signals · Satellite imagery-based reporting from reputable outlets
⚠ Invalidated if: No additional official statements and no major follow-up reporting beyond repeats/rehashes · Credible correction that materially reduces the claimed damage profile
EMERGING
Strong
B
Alliance friction: US pushes burden-sharing (72h)
House: 66%
(range: 55%–76%)
50 sources · 16% Tier-A · Consensus 0.64 · ↘ Decelerating · Contradiction low (0.18)
“By 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC, US officials will reiterate (or allies will publicly respond to) a burden-sharing/reciprocity demand tied to alignment on the conflict posture, signa...”
→Will the US publicly demand additional allied support tied to the conflict posture by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will a major European government publicly reject or condition US requests by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will NATO leadership address internal divisions related to the conflict by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
→Will US officials tie access/logistics cooperation to alignment by 29 April 2026 23:59 UTC?
👁 Watch: Statements from US Defence and NATO leadership · European government responses (support/refusal/conditions) · Operational announcements tying access/support to alignment
⚠ Invalidated if: Clear pivot to conciliatory alliance messaging with explicit de-escalation of demands · New developments that unify alliance messaging and remove the reciprocity frame
FRONTIER
Weak
C
Shipping disruption premium persists (tanker/shipping focus)
House: 53%
(range: 36%–65%)
16 sources · 6% Tier-A · Consensus 0.70 · Unclear · Contradiction low (0.20)
“By 29 April 2026, shipping-disruption coverage linked to energy logistics (especially Hormuz-adjacent routes) will remain active enough to generate at least one additional major...”
→Will there be a major shipping-disruption headline affecting energy logistics by 29 April 2026?
→Will freight/tanker-rate commentary intensify by 29 April 2026?
→Will insurers issue new guidance impacting Hormuz-linked traffic by 29 April 2026?
→Will the disruption narrative fade by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: New insurer guidance or rerouting/convoy reporting · Freight-rate/charter-rate headline prints (tanker routes) · Any official navigation advisories affecting commercial traffic
⚠ Invalidated if: Shipping disruption narrative fades from major coverage for 48+ hours · Clear operational normalisation statements dominate (ports/insurers/navy lanes)
US Politics & Policy
8 beliefs · 438 sources
EMERGING
Strong
A
Warsh nomination: committee action in next 72h
House: 66%
(range: 56%–74%)
68 sources · 4% Tier-A · Consensus 0.82 · → Stable · Contradiction low (0.08)
“By 29 April 2026, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee will take a formal procedural step advancing Kevin Warsh’s nomination for Fed Chair (e.g., a committee vote or equivalent doc...”
→Will the Senate Banking Committee advance Kevin Warsh’s Fed Chair nomination by 29 April 2026?
→Will there be a public schedule confirmation of a committee vote by 29 April 2026?
→Will the nomination be delayed/postponed past 29 April 2026?
→Will leadership-transition coverage materially fade by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Official committee schedule updates and whip/statement coverage · Major outlets confirming exact vote timing and expected margin · Any surprise reopening/continuation narrative around the prior DOJ matter
⚠ Invalidated if: Senate Banking Committee vote is formally postponed past 29 April 2026 · New disqualifying allegation/process friction emerges and dominates coverage
CONSENSUS
Strong
B
Democratic 'mismanagement/fraud' narrative persists (72h)
House: 64%
(range: 50%–74%)
50 sources · 14% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · ↘ Decelerating
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), claims of Democratic-linked fraud/mismanagement of public funds will still be circulating with follow-up coverage (i.e., not decisively resolved or aband...”
→Will the Democratic fraud/mismanagement narrative still be active by 29 April 2026?
→Will a named Democratic official face a new formal inquiry linked to these claims by 29 April 2026?
→Will Tier-A outlets publish a material debunking by 29 April 2026?
→Will Congress announce an oversight step tied to the allegations by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Ethics/IG announcements · Tier-A escalation to confirmed enforcement
⚠ Invalidated if: Tier-A debunking that collapses the narrative · Official closure without adverse findings
CONSENSUS
Strong
B
ICE controversy & enforcement-friction stays in news (72h)
House: 67%
(range: 55%–78%)
118 sources · 13% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), the ICE enforcement/detention controversy cluster (arrest-rate narratives plus headline detention cases) will still be receiving follow-up reporting and/...”
→Will ICE detention/enforcement controversies remain a top national political/legal story by 29 April 2026?
→Will a new federal court order affecting an ICE detention/deportation case be reported by 29 April 2026?
→Will ICE/DHS announce a policy clarification responding to the controversy by 29 April 2026?
→Will reporting indicate ICE arrest activity remains depressed vs recent baseline by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: New ICE detention-related court filings · DHS/ICE public guidance or internal memo leaks
⚠ Invalidated if: Sustained drop-off in follow-up reporting across diverse outlets · A clarifying decision that ends the headline cases without further action
CONSENSUS
Strong
B
Federal courts keep blocking Trump asylum curbs (72h)
House: 81%
(range: 74%–88%)
50 sources · 14% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), the reported federal court block on Trump-administration asylum restrictions will still be in effect (i.e., not stayed or reversed).”
→Will the court block on Trump’s asylum restrictions still stand by 29 April 2026?
→Will an emergency stay be granted for the Trump asylum restrictions by 29 April 2026?
→Will DOJ file an expedited appeal/stay motion on the asylum case by 29 April 2026?
→Will the administration materially rewrite the asylum restrictions to bypass the ruling by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Stay motion docket activity · Signals of expedited briefing or Supreme Court posture
⚠ Invalidated if: Emergency stay granted or injunction dissolved · Restrictions rescinded/replaced in a way that moots the case
CONSENSUS
Strong
B
DOJ denaturalisation/citizenship revocation intensifies (72h)
House: 79%
(range: 69%–87%)
50 sources · 14% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), the corpus will continue to report DOJ activity and/or intensified signalling around denaturalisation/citizenship revocation of naturalised citizens, wit...”
→Will DOJ maintain an intensified denaturalisation posture by 29 April 2026?
→Will a new high-profile denaturalisation case be reported by 29 April 2026?
→Will courts materially limit DOJ denaturalisation pathways by 29 April 2026?
→Will DHS/USCIS issue aligned guidance on revocation screening by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: New filings and agency guidance · Civil-liberties litigation escalation
⚠ Invalidated if: Formal narrowing statement · Constraining precedent or injunction
EMERGING
Strong
B
Idaho border-enforcement bills remain stalled (72h)
House: 76%
(range: 64%–84%)
50 sources · 14% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), Idaho will not have passed new border-enforcement bills (the legislative push remains stalled).”
→Will Idaho pass new border-enforcement bills by 29 April 2026?
→Will Idaho’s governor call a special session for border enforcement by 29 April 2026?
→Will a committee schedule a decisive vote on a border enforcement bill by 29 April 2026?
→Will Idaho lawmakers publicly abandon the border-bill push by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Calendar/agenda changes · Sponsor statements on timing
⚠ Invalidated if: Surprise vote passage · Special-session acceleration
CONSENSUS
Strong
B
Trump sexual-assault scrutiny stays active (72h)
House: 69%
(range: 57%–79%)
50 sources · 8% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), reporting and/or legal scrutiny tied to sexual-assault allegations involving Donald Trump will still be active, with no definitive resolution closing the...”
→Will Trump-related sexual-assault scrutiny remain in the news by 29 April 2026?
→Will a prosecutor or court filing materially escalate the allegations by 29 April 2026?
→Will a major political figure issue a distancing statement by 29 April 2026?
→Will a credible correction/retraction deflate the story by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Court docket activity · Donor/party reactions
⚠ Invalidated if: Credible debunk/retraction · Clear legal disposition mooting further inquiry
FRONTIER
Unknown
C
Ideological green-card denial story gains traction (72h)
House: 47%
(range: 28%–66%)
2 sources · Consensus 0.80 · Unclear
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), the ideological-screening green-card denial story will receive broader corroboration (additional independent outlets or official documentation), beyond t...”
→Will the ideological-screening green-card story be corroborated by 29 April 2026?
→Will USCIS/DHS issue a statement on ideological screening by 29 April 2026?
→Will a lawsuit be filed challenging the denial by 29 April 2026?
→Will Tier-A outlets publish follow-up confirming details by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Agency statements · Court filings
⚠ Invalidated if: No corroboration · Case mischaracterised
Fed & Monetary Policy
2 beliefs · 150 sources
CONSENSUS
Strong
A
Fed holds: no rate cut announcement in next 72h
House: 87%
(range: 82%–91%)
100 sources · 6% Tier-A · Consensus 0.90 · → Stable · Contradiction low (0.05)
“Between 26 April 2026 and 29 April 2026 (inclusive), the U.S. Federal Reserve will not announce an interest-rate cut.”
→Will the Fed announce a rate cut by 29 April 2026?
→Will there be an emergency inter-meeting rate move by 29 April 2026?
→Will major Fed communication shift to signalling imminent easing by 29 April 2026?
→Will front-end rates markets materially reprice towards cuts before 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Fed speaker cadence and tone over 26–29 April 2026 · Front-end Treasury yield moves (2Y) and SOFR/futures repricing · Oil and petrol price headlines reinforcing/weakening inflation-risk framing
⚠ Invalidated if: Emergency inter-meeting cut signalled by the Fed · A sudden, widely-credible inflation downshift narrative replacing “sticky inflation” in top-tier sources
EMERGING
Strong
A
Pandemic loan fraud: Treasury action/plan signalled in 72h
House: 56%
(range: 41%–67%)
50 sources · 18% Tier-A · Consensus 0.82 · → Stable · Contradiction low (0.10)
“By 29 April 2026, the U.S. Treasury will issue a public statement or documented action-plan update regarding recovery/enforcement tied to the reported SBA referral of suspected ...”
→Will Treasury announce a recovery/enforcement step tied to the SBA fraud referrals by 29 April 2026?
→Will DOJ/Treasury disclose seizure/collection figures by 29 April 2026?
→Will the story shift from referrals to prosecutions by 29 April 2026?
→Will there be Congressional hearing chatter on pandemic loan fraud by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Treasury/DOJ public statements and press briefings · Congressional commentary indicating enforcement timetable · Any disclosed recovery metrics (seizures, collections, prosecutions)
⚠ Invalidated if: Treasury provides no public update through 29 April 2026 · Narrative shifts to inter-agency process delays without an actionable next-step
Other Signals
4 beliefs · 143 sources
EMERGING
Strong
B
DOJ push to limit state-bar oversight advances (72h)
House: 72%
(range: 63%–81%)
41 sources · 31% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), the DOJ-linked effort described in the corpus to limit state-bar oversight of federal prosecutors will still be advancing (procedurally or narratively), ...”
→Will DOJ continue pursuing limits on state-bar oversight by 29 April 2026?
→Will Congress announce a hearing/oversight step on prosecutor discipline rules by 29 April 2026?
→Will DOJ/OLC publish guidance on pre-emption of state discipline by 29 April 2026?
→Will state bar associations publicly oppose the DOJ effort by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: OPR/OLC references · Bar association mobilisations
⚠ Invalidated if: Official denial/withdrawal · Blocking legislative/judicial action
CONSENSUS
Strong
B
DOJ expands federal death-penalty posture (72h)
House: 84%
(range: 77%–90%)
50 sources · 14% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), DOJ will still be described by the corpus as expanding/reaffirming federal death-penalty support (including execution-method posture), with no credible r...”
→Will DOJ maintain an expanded federal death-penalty posture by 29 April 2026?
→Will DOJ issue additional guidance on execution methods by 29 April 2026?
→Will a federal court block DOJ execution-method changes by 29 April 2026?
→Will Congress announce oversight steps on federal execution policy by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: BOP operational actions · Litigation calendar updates
⚠ Invalidated if: DOJ narrowing/reversal · Immediate blocking injunction
EMERGING
Strong
B
DHS smart-glasses/surveillance budget item advances (72h)
House: 63%
(range: 48%–74%)
50 sources · 10% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · → Stable
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), DHS’s smart-glasses/surveillance-technology budget proposal will still be active in the appropriations discourse (not clearly removed), though it may fac...”
→Will DHS smart-glasses funding remain in play by 29 April 2026?
→Will appropriators explicitly restrict DHS wearable surveillance tech by 29 April 2026?
→Will DHS publish a privacy-impact clarification by 29 April 2026?
→Will civil-liberties groups trigger a formal inquiry by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Committee report language · Agency privacy documentation
⚠ Invalidated if: Budget language removed · Official correction that the item is misreported
FRONTIER
Unknown
B
Wyoming abortion ban injunction stays in place (72h)
House: 71%
(range: 43%–81%)
2 sources · Consensus 0.90 · Unclear
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), the reported judicial block/injunction against a Wyoming abortion ban will still be in effect (no emergency stay reversing it).”
→Will the Wyoming abortion ban remain blocked by 29 April 2026?
→Will a higher court stay the injunction by 29 April 2026?
→Will Wyoming announce immediate enforcement tactics despite the injunction by 29 April 2026?
→Will the case be expedited to a higher court by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Stay motion filings · Wyoming AG guidance
⚠ Invalidated if: Emergency stay · Immediate enforcement despite order
Legal & Regulatory
2 beliefs · 51 sources
CONSENSUS
Strong
B
Texas immigration detention/arrest law proceeds (72h)
House: 73%
(range: 60%–83%)
50 sources · 16% Tier-A · Consensus 1.00 · ↗ Accelerating
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), Texas’s controversial immigration detention/arrest law framework (as characterised by the corpus) will not be newly enjoined or paused and will continue ...”
→Will Texas’s immigration enforcement/detention law remain in effect through 29 April 2026?
→Will a federal court issue a new stay/injunction against the Texas law by 29 April 2026?
→Will Texas announce a pause or narrowed enforcement approach by 29 April 2026?
→Will DHS/DOJ take a formal step against Texas’s enforcement within 72 hours?
👁 Watch: Appellate docket movement · Texas agency enforcement guidance
⚠ Invalidated if: Emergency injunction/stay · Texas implementation pause
FRONTIER
Distorted
C
DOL joint-employer proposal remains active (72h)
House: 56%
(range: 33%–72%)
1 sources · 100% Tier-A · Consensus 0.80 · Unclear
“By 29 April 2026 (UTC), the US Department of Labor’s proposed joint-employer standard will not be withdrawn or materially reversed (it remains an active proposal).”
→Will DOL keep the joint-employer proposal live through 29 April 2026?
→Will DOL publish additional details/clarifications by 29 April 2026?
→Will business or labour coalitions respond publicly by 29 April 2026?
→Will a court challenge be filed immediately by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: DOL updates · Coalition responses
⚠ Invalidated if: Withdrawal/correction · Immediate pre-emption
Trade & Tariffs
1 beliefs · 48 sources
EMERGING
Strong
A
Tariff authority curtailed: no fast reversal in 72h
House: 79%
(range: 69%–86%)
48 sources · 4% Tier-A · Consensus 0.86 · ↘ Decelerating · Contradiction low (0.08)
“By 29 April 2026, there will be no court-ordered stay or reversal that restores the rejected tariff authority basis described in the Supreme Court rejection coverage.”
→Will the Supreme Court tariff-authority rejection be stayed/reversed by 29 April 2026?
→Will the administration announce a workaround tariff authority by 29 April 2026?
→Will importer/tariff refund guidance be issued by 29 April 2026?
→Will consumer-price commentary emphasise tariff refund distribution by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Court docket/stay motions coverage · CBP/IRS/importer guidance and timeline reporting · White House/Congress statements signalling a fast workaround
⚠ Invalidated if: A court stay/suspension is granted before 29 April 2026 · A new tariff action is announced using a clearly substitutable authority within the same window
Economy & Markets
1 beliefs · 37 sources
EMERGING
Strong
A
Big Tech cost reset: more layoff/buyout headlines in 72h
House: 64%
(range: 52%–76%)
37 sources · 16% Tier-A · Consensus 0.80 · → Stable · Contradiction low (0.12)
“By 29 April 2026, there will be at least one additional high-visibility headline update (new detail, expansion, or peer confirmation) about Microsoft’s workforce reduction/buyou...”
→Will there be another major Microsoft workforce reduction/buyout headline by 29 April 2026?
→Will another Big Tech firm announce a comparable cost action by 29 April 2026?
→Will AI capex vs opex commentary intensify by 29 April 2026?
→Will the narrative shift towards labour-market spillovers by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: SEC filings/earnings-call wording about opex vs capex shifts · Follow-on reports on participation rates in voluntary programmes · Broader tech-labour print (new redundancies or hiring freezes)
⚠ Invalidated if: Company clarifies a hard stop to workforce actions with no further programmes · Coverage shifts decisively from workforce reductions to hiring/expansion in the same firms
Energy & Commodities
1 beliefs · 8 sources
FRONTIER
Weak
C
Oil price spike narrative persists (corporate/analyst lens)
House: 57%
(range: 39%–69%)
8 sources · Consensus 0.66 · Unclear · Contradiction low (0.18)
“By 29 April 2026, there will be at least one additional high-visibility headline asserting an oil price spike/surge linked to the Iran conflict (corporate or analyst framing).”
→Will there be a new major headline about an oil price surge tied to the Iran conflict by 29 April 2026?
→Will petrol/diesel price headlines follow oil headlines by 29 April 2026?
→Will de-escalation headlines reduce the “surge” framing by 29 April 2026?
→Will the story broaden into inflation-policy consequences by 29 April 2026?
👁 Watch: Front-page crude moves tied explicitly to Hormuz/Iran developments · Retail petrol price headlines and inflation-expectations commentary · Any supply response rhetoric from producers
⚠ Invalidated if: Energy complex sells off materially alongside de-escalation headlines · New coverage establishes the earlier “surge” framing as erroneous/overstated
NEWS · Crypto
Crypto Whale's Loss Highlights Market Mispricing Risks
The recent $15 million unrealised loss from the crypto trader pension-usdt.eth underscores the risks of high-leverage trading amid market volatility. After amassing a substantial bearish position based on an anticipated downturn in Bitcoin and Ethereum, the trader faced a sharp market rebound, resulting in severe losses. This incident serves as a cautionary tale in a market characterized by large speculative positions and high leverage. The market may be mispricing the likelihood of further price declines, given the recent resilience of Bitcoin and Ethereum despite adverse trading conditions. NOAH's PolyHunter system identifies a 75% probability that prices will revert, contrasting sharply with the current market pricing, which implies a lower likelihood of continued declines. This discrepancy represents an edge of approximately…
NEWS · Crypto
Bitcoin's Stability Amid US-Iran Tensions
As US-Iran tensions escalate, Bitcoin has surprisingly held firm above $68,000, with traders on Polymarket assigning only a 0.1% probability that it will fall below this threshold by April 24. This outlook persists despite low trading volumes, reflecting a broader market sentiment that appears to overlook potential volatility driven by geopolitical factors. The market may be mispricing Bitcoin's stability due to a lack of trading activity; only $219 in USDC has been exchanged in the April 24 market, indicating that minor shifts in sentiment could drastically alter expectations. Furthermore, the absence of bets on a drop to $60,000 suggests that investors are currently reluctant to contemplate significant downside risks. NOAH's PolyHunter system identifies a 5% edge in favor of Bitcoin…